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ABSTRACT

A study of two small-to-middle-sized midwestern school districts, each observed for over a year, shows that the negotiated order concept can provide a useful framework for viewing schools' organizational functions. According to the negotiated order concept, organizational relationships require constant negotiations concerning values, goals, rules, role expectations, authority hierarchies, resource distributions, responses to new situations, decisions, courses of action, and the interests of individuals, groups, and the organization as a whole. The problems in both districts studied were similar, varying in source, emergence, magnitude, duration, and intensity, as well as in the degree and type of negotiations involved in their resolution. Still, one district was found to be more clearly a negotiated order than the other. Analysis of the differences between the two districts in the context of the literature, other observational data, and the limits of negotiation, leads to identification of 12 factors influencing the frequency and nature of negotiation. Among these factors are organizational growth or decline, organizational success or failure, routine or varied activities, organizational size, recruitment of outside administrators, organizational change, decentralization of authority, and operation within an aroused environment. (PGD)

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School System as Negotiated Order?:*

A Comparative Analysis of Two Medium-Sized Public School Districts

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Introduction

Without belaboring the point, it is clear that American public education has been found increasingly wanting in the past decade. Some responsibility for that has been placed upon the inability of school organizations to work as they were intended. Such criticism is not, however, limited to public school systems. Indeed all institutions, particularly public ones, composed of large-scale, complex, formal bureaucracies have been criticized for their deflection from and distortion of purpose.

Nevertheless, for years many in the scholarly community have stated that Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy is an incorrect, misleading and unfortunate model (Corwin, 1977). The hope remains, however, that complex organizations could rationally and effectively achieve their goals and therefore the dominant paradigm persists. The past decade has, however, seen more numerous questions arise that challenge the traditional view. Benson (1979) has labelled this situation "the crisis of the rational model." He has clustered the four main groups of challengers into the demythodologizers, the ecologizers, the politicizers, and the totalizers. For our purposes, what is significant is that each of the clusters constitutes different ways of viewing, conceptualizing, and manipulating organizational forms which are metaphorical. It is our view that there are numerous facets to reality or multiple realities and thus many ways of presenting partial truths about the natures of reality. Morgan (1980) has most recently captured the essence and significance of metaphor with reference to organizational theory.

> "The use of a metaphor serves to generate an image for studying a subject. This image can provide the basis for detailed scientific research based upon attempts to discover the extent to which features of the metaphor are found in the subject of inquiry. Much of the puzzle-solving activity of normal science is of this kind, with scientists attempting to examine, operationalize, and measure detailed implications of the metaphorical insight upon which their

> research is implicity or explicitly based. Such confinement of attention calls for a great deal of prior and somewhat irrational commitment to the image of the subject of investigation, for any one metaphorical insight provides but a partial and one-sided view of the phenomenon to which it is applied.

Because using a metaphor means emphasizing certain features and suppressing others of the studied object, it is "a form of creative expression which relies upon constructive falsehood as a means of liberating the imagination" (Morgan, 1980:612).

This paper represents an attempt to apply one metaphor in the area of organizational studies, the negotiated order, to public school districts. For over two years, the authors observed the operations of two school systems to see if their structure and processes could be effectively viewed through the conceptual prism of the negotiated order. In what follows we present the basic idea and elements of the negotiated order, a brief description of the communities, districts, and research methods, an analysis of the differences between the districts in terms of the negotiated order, and the limitations of the use of the metaphor in the observed school systems. We will conclude by moving toward the specification of conditions that facilitate the negotiated order.

The Negotiated Order and Its Application to School Systems

The negotiated order model of organizations was developed by Anselm Strauss and his colleagues, Leonard Schatzman, Rue Bucher, Danuta Ehrlich, and Melvin Sabshin (1963, 1964) in the course of studying two psychiatric hospitals, a large state mental hospital, and a psychiatric wing in a smaller highly respected private general hospital. A summary of the main points of that work was recently provided by Strauss (1978:5-6).

> 1. We stated that social order was negotiated order: In the organizations studied, apparently there could be no organizational relationships without accompanying negotiations.

2. Specific negotiations seemed contingent on specific structural conditions: who negotiated with whom, when, and about what. So the negotiations were patterned, not accidental. They could be studied in terms of their conditions, character, and consequences for persons and organizations.

3. The products of negotiation (contracts, understandings, agreements, "rules," and so forth) all had temporal limits, for eventually they would be reviewed, reevaluated, revised, revoked, or renewed.

4. Negotiated order had to be worked at, and the bases of concerted action needed to be continually reconstituted. Not only were negotiations continually terminated, but new ones were also made daily.

5. The negotiated order on any given day could be conceived of as the sum total of the organization's rules and policies, along with whatever agreements, understandings, pacts, contracts, and other working arrangements currently obtained. These include agreements at every level of the organization, of every clique and coalition and include covert as well as overt agreements.

6. Any changes impinging on the negotiated order--whether something ordinary, such as a new staff member, a disrupting event, or a betrayed contract, or whether more unusual, such as the introduction of a new technological element or a new ideology--called for renegotiation or reappraisal. This meant consequent changes in the negotiated order.

7. We went on to suggest that the reconstitution of social or organizational order (which was our central concern) might be fruitfully conceived of in terms of a complex relationship between the daily negotiation process and a periodic appraisal process. The form not only allowed the daily work to get done but also reacted on the more formalized and permanent organizational rules, policies, and established conventions and understandings. In turn, the latter served to set the limits and some directions of negotiation.

8. We suggested, finally, that future studies of the complex relationships that exist between the more stable elements of organizational order and the more fleeting working arrangements might profit by examining the former as if they were sometimes a background, against which the latter were being evolved in the foreground, and sometimes as if the reverse obtained. What was needed was both a concentrated focus on and the development of a terminology adequate to handle this kind of background-foreground metaphor. But, whether that metaphor or another, the central question was "How do negotiation and appraisal play into each other and into the rules, policies and other 'more stable' elements of social order?"

The metaphor of the negotiated order then suggests that at any given time, the following social objects may be subject to negotiation because of ambiguity or conflict-values, goals, rules, role expectations

and relationships, authority hierarchies, resource distributions, collective vs. group vs. individual interests, responses to new situations, decisions and courses of action.

Recently, Strauss (1978) has specified more facets of the negotiated order. It includes a) the structural context, including the actors' theories of negotiation; b) the negotiation context and its properties; c) the actual interactions themselves including subprocesses of negotiation. By structural context Strauss means the salient structural properties that bear upon and surround the negotiation context. The negotiation context includes characteristics of negotiators, type of negotiations, relative balance of power, stakes in the negotiation, visibility of negotiations, number and complexity of issues, legitimacy of the issues, options to avoid or discontinue negotiations. Strauss does not provide us with a concrete definition of negotiation although he lists a number of related terms, including bargain, arrange, reconcile, understanding, and adjustment. In general, our view of negotiation is that it occurs in situations where there are opposing differences or alternative perspectives and in which there is an exchange which involves more than the simple statement or awareness of those.

The above formulation by Strauss alleviates some criticism of the metaphor. Day and Day (1977) cogently revealed the limitations of the work of Strauss et al. First, they note that the conceptualization of negotiation and bargaining suggests a cooperative and usually smooth process involving temporary disruptions but with little evidence of what we might call coercive power or extended conflict. Power, to the extent that it is recognized, is situational and contingent and refers to the ability of different participants to control the course of events and actions of others. Power should be, according to the Days, embedded in structural

attributes and not simply be seen as representing one's interpersonal maneuvers. Secondly, they strongly object to the abstraction of the negotiations, situations, and the organization from a larger sociohistorical context. By failing to take into account how the larger external structure affects the organization or how higher levels may constrain the options of lower levels, the Days say our attention may be directed to the fluff, to verbal exchanges of trivial matters. The subjects of negotiation may have limited impact on the organization as a whole or even on the participants. The negotiated order theorists, they suggest, may consequently exaggerate the degree of organizational change. The perspective, they argue, needs to be more politically, structurally, and historically grounded and its subjective aspects need to be tempered by attention to objective material events.

What is required is a contextualization which locates a negotiation, a situation, a unit, or an organization in a systemic manner. Elihu Gerson (1976) recognizes that organizations, groups, and individuals are involved in many situations. The actors' ability to function in those situations is a function of their sovereignty, "the net balance of resources and constraints available...across the full range of settings in which the actor(s) participates." Organization life, to Gerson, is viewed in terms of the flow and degree of sovereignty inter- and intra-situationally. Maines (1977) says that intra- and inter-organizational relationships should be seen in terms of nested negotiative situations which affect each other. Our general assumption is that higher order settings limit relatively lower order settings, i.e., the options and resources are less for lower order participants and the constraints are greater. Successful control, however, depends upon monitoring, coordination, and compliance which are not necessarily automatic. The consequence of this

formulation would be to explore, for example, how actions emanating the state capital limit the school board (as well as induce certain actions by program funding) or how decisions by the school board or the administrative staff affect the principal and teachers of a school. Lower level participants can also create problems for those above them and negotiate across levels but the general direction of control is downward. It seems obvious to state the reason for the previous statement lies in the distribution and enactment of power. Whether or not there is negotiation is a function of power. Who gets to take part, the content of the negotiation, its process and outcome are also resultants of power. We therefore added a conception of power and context to our model of the negotiated order.

While numerous kinds of complex organizations have been studied including individual schools, there is very little scholarship on the empirical status or theoretical models of school systems qua systems. It was our supposition that the metaphors would provide insight when matched with school systems for the following reasons. Almost everyone who examines the organizational aspect of education comments on the multiplicity and ambiguity of its objectives, goals, and associated values. They also note that there is an uncertainty about results of the educational process and the application of criteria to evaluate the relation between goals and products. These conditions would be conducive to negotiation as participants stress particular or new goals in conjunction with forms and processes to attempt to reach them. The ambiguity and uncertainty would seemingly lead to numerous problematic situations requiring definition, interpretation, and bargaining to achieve collective definitions and practical solutions.

Educational organizations are interesting mixtures of political, bureaucratic, and professional involvements. Teachers regard themselves

as professionals and thus try to maintain autonomy over their work situation. Indeed, the diffuseness of authority characteristic of school systems derives in parts from professionalism and autonomy. On the other hand, schools have porous boundaries because the ultimate formal and legal control of the schools derives from the community which provides the pupils, the funds, the leaders and policy-makers. Thus in a sense, at two ends the autonomy is potentially challenged by "the people." To compound the relationship is the fact that the coordination of schools has become complex. A partial answer has been to increase the levels of bureaucratic administrators and numbers of rules and regulations. Drives for autonomy and "the people's will" can become reflected in and refracted by administrative decisions and rules. Also all of the administrative units, people's representatives, and teaching professionals can develop interests of their own in conflict to varying degrees with that of other units or the total collectivity. Conflict is always possible and frequently present. Negotiation and bargaining are potential means to bring about accommodation and resolution.

Decisions in school organizations may occur under constraints of time, resources, anticipation, external and internal pressures. Current circumstances show increasingly limited resources and increasing external pressure from state and federal governments, not to mention that of community groups and unionizing teachers. In addition, problems cannot always be anticipated and time pressures of deadlines prevent complete planning, discussion, and calculations. Limited resources require saying "no" to some, probable unequal redistribution, program postponements or cutbacks. We also assumed that new situations and contingencies are regularly occurring events for which there are no

obvious answers or rules. The response to all of these constraints could be some form of negotiation.

Finally, as in the hospital, the personnel are continually changing due to resignation, promotion, and hiring. While not approximating the hospital in terms of different kinds of professionals and ideological variation, partially different perspectives seem likely as a result of institutional commitment, career stage, length of employment, social background, reference groups, and communication network. The turnover and different perspectives mean that "institutional memory" is incomplete and nonconsensual. Situations cannot necessarily be confronted in the same way and negotiation can result.

The Communities, The School Districts, and Research Methods

Meadmont is a midwestern community of between 30,000 and 60,000.[1] The city and surrounding area have shown steady, moderate growth for some time, with expectations of a continued trend. Over 90% of the population is white and the rest black. The city has some industrial development with several companies employing over 1,000 workers each and several others with over 500. The more general activity of Meadmont is service and government. The city is within a few hours of several metropolitan areas, an educational center, and a large recreational area. The community has a thriving downtown and a new suburban shopping center. In addition, it has another major thoroughfare of fast-food franchises, discount stores, small shops and restaurants. Meadmont has about 50 religious institutions, one daily newspaper, several hospitals, an extensive public park system, a historical museum, a public library, one television and five radio stations, a college, six movie theaters and two country

[1]The name of this community, like all others, is a pseudonym.

clubs. It has a popular community theater and a community symphony. Meadmont has many Baptists, persons of German-American ancestry, and a large Roman-Catholic population.

Meadmont in the late 1970's had a $20,000-per-household average income. Thirty percent had over $25,000 and 20% had less than $8,000. The more affluent areas of town were in the East and Northwest with an area in the South of old established wealthy families. The black and poorer families tended to live in the center of the community. Older and blue-collar families were concentrated in the South and North side of the city. Middle-income housing was moving westward. Meadmonters, in general, regard themselves as conservative, patriotic, and religious. The local newspaper has a strident conservative tone. High school graduates who go to college tell us that they prefer to stay away because the town is so traditional and boring. The elected political representatives, from both political parties, are among the more conservative wings of their parties.

The Meadmont school district, through annexations, is larger than the city and encompasses a population between 50,000 and 75,000. In addition, the school district is experiencing increases in enrollment contrary to current trends elsewhere. The district's assessed property valuation is growing quite rapidly so that it has a low tax levy and has been able to build one new school from its own budget. The district has between 7,000 and 10,000 students and about 12 school buildings. Most were built since the 1950's, but several are over 50 years old and in need of extensive renovation. The district is governed by a six-member elected school board and administered by a superintendent, two assistant superintendents, and five directors. The district employs between 350 and 600 teachers and offers a generally conventional curriculum although

there are some open instructional areas and some departmentalization at the elementary level. The Meadmont school system takes great pride in its performance, its success, its history, and its traditions. Standardized test scores for students at all levels are well above national and state norms. The high school has had great success in musical and athletic interscholastic competition. There is a strong sense of school spirit in the system and the community. A recently retired superintendent who served for over 20 years and was regarded as a charismatic leader is given credit for those accomplishments. At the time of our study the new superintendent was in the process of developing effective control.

Cooley Corners is a smaller community of between 25,000 and 50,000. Its population has been relatively stable for about 40 years although there is much mobility into and out of the community and shifts in the area of development. Preliminary 1980 census figures, however, show a 10% decrease since 1970. The population is about 90% white and 10% black. The city is primarily a service and marketing center for a surrounding agricultural region but is also the county seat. There has been a recent increase in industrial development with new companies building local plants. The downtown is decaying and losing business while alongside the two highways, shopping centers, fast-food franchises, and discount stores expand. Cooley Corners has a junior college, over 50 religious institutions, several libraries, one newspaper, three radio stations, a hospital, several parks, three movie theaters, and a country club. The community has had a symphony for many years, and a community theater has developed recently. It also has a small Jewish community. The town, once a booming railroad town, is now a relatively sleepy stable community except for intermittent political scandals. People in Cooley Corners express great pride in not being like the East, California, or the big

cities. They stress that they are small-town conservative, religious, American, and midwestern. Their politics tends to represent those views.

There is a very affluent suburb in the Northeast part of the community and a larger, less wealthy development within the city limits in the Northeast. The black population, which is quite poor, is concentrated in the southern part of town, separated from the rest of the town by the downtown, railroad tracks, and highways. The western part of town is dominated by small bungalows of blue-collar families. In the eastern part of the city, there are large old impressive homes intermingled with smaller, less impressive homes of lower-middle and upper-working class families. Cooley Corners is a poorer community than Meadmont. In the late 1970's, its average per household income was $14,000 with only 15% above $25,000 and 36% below $8,000.

The Cooley Corners school system, which also is governed by a six-member board of education, is neither viewed nor perceives itself as successful. There is little enthusiasm or pride within the system. Standardized test scores approximate national profiles but school officials talk about a high-low syndrome which shows a small middle range, disproportionate number in the low range and a small number of high performers. The district is run by a superintendent, two assistant superintendents, and several coordinators. There are about 10 buildings, over 3,500 pupils, and under 400 teachers. Most of the buildings are over 50 years old with the exception of a middle school and one elementary school. The curriculum and instruction are quite traditional except that part of the middle school was built as an "open" facility. Like many other districts, Cooley Corners has seen enrollment decreases in the last decade. A significant fact about Cooley Corners is that desegregation was systematically resisted until eventual acquiescence. Cooley Corners

recently inaugurated its fourth superintendent in the past 10 years. The first one of the four served the district for over 10 years and his predecessor had served for over 30. External and internal perceptions attribute district problems to the inactivity of those administrators. The district is viewed around the state as a valuable stop for ambitious, upwardly-mobile administrators.

It is important to point out these school districts certainly are not typical of either very large urban districts or smaller rural ones. Any conclusions or generalizations would be limited by those facts although the ability to make comparisons between these districts and with others is possible. It can be seen from Table 1 (see page 45) that the two districts fell into categories that constituted about 20% of the total number of districts in the country in the late 1970's but represented districts containing over a third of all the pupils enrolled. While we would have liked to study more and certainly larger districts, these two do represent a significant and reasonable number of contemporary school districts.

Since our theory directed us to actual behavior, our methodology required that we observe in the field. Each district was observed for over one year by both researchers. Over much of the research period while schools were in session, we averaged about three days a week in the field. We spent some time in every building in the two districts and extended amounts of time in at least one building at each level--elementary, junior, and senior high schools. Some of that time was spent in classrooms, teachers' lounges, and principals' offices. In addition, we attended meetings of the school boards--public, closed, and informal; administrations--all district, principals, teachers and central administration; building staff; teacher organizations; departments; special

committees--curriculum, gifted, citizen's advisory; bond campaign groups--steering committees, neighborhood organizations, local schools; PTA's; staff-board-administration; and state school board and administrator associations. There were, of course, numerous informal discussions before and after these meetings as well as on "drop in" bases.

In addition, formal interviews were conducted with major figures in the districts--administrators, board members, principals, and some teachers--about their backgrounds, experiences, philosophies and concerns. Subscriptions were also obtained to the local newspapers and when possible local radio and television stations were monitored. Past histories were examined through scrapbooks, files and reports, and an authorized history of one district.

As part of our agreement with the two systems and all of its members, we promised anonymity and confidentiality. We did not disclose to either district the name or anything about the other district. We did not communicate information within the districts that we had obtained from anyone, whether good or bad. All names that are included in this paper are pseudonyms. We have also altered situations, persons, statistics, and histories slightly to maintain the anonymity. No changes do damage to the overall thrust of the data or the analysis.

Differences in Negotiations Between Meadmont and Cooley Corners

On the bases of our observations and analysis, the Meadmont School District appears more like a negotiated order than does Cooley Corners. Negotiations are more frequent occurrences at each level of the system, between levels, and between system and community in Meadmont than in Cooley Corners. To make such an assertion does not mean that power is widely dispersed. Those with power and resources are

small in number and if they participate in negotiations, they tend to dominate the process and the outcomes.

Examining the districts as totalities indicates several factors which have bearing upon the frequency of negotiation. These factors involve the interplay of objective and subjective elements. Objectively, Meadmont is a growing district, both in terms of enrollments and the value of property within the community. Its facilities are more modern and satisfactory. Programs are more developed and better supported. Recognition of the schools has been obtained in a variety of areas. This has been translated into a sense of pride, a positive image, and a higher level of self-esteem among participants throughout the system. As a result they are more likely to be efficacious and to make requests or suggestions which lead to negotiations. Cooley Corners participants more often reflect the lack of success, the declining enrollment, the outdated facilities with a low self-image and a passivity, resignation, and fatalism.

The Meadmont district is about twice as large as Cooley Corners and more complexly organized. There are more levels of administration, buildings, teachers, ancillary staff, and students. They are also aggregated into larger units than in Cooley Corners. This provides for more opportunities for contacts, possible problems and elongates the distance between top and bottom. In general, there is a greater willingness to bring concerns to superordinates in Meadmont than in Cooley Corners. One reason is that they believe it is less likely to come to the attention of the superintendent and his assistants than do those in Cooley Corners. In addition, the size and complexity of the district lead to greater delegation of responsibility and involvement by participants in decision-making and problem-solving. There are more active committees and meetings on more subjects in Meadmont than in Cooley Corners. Greater

involvement, delegation, and more levels leads to a possible greater concern with coordination and more negotiation around those points.

Probably the most important difference between the systems and the degree of negotiation can be found in comparing the superintendents. Herman Jameson, the superintendent in Cooley Corners, acted in ways that minimized negotiations. He totally managed the affairs of the entire district. Jameson, previously the high school principal, succeeded a man who had shaken up the system and terrified numerous personnel. Jameson sought to create an atmosphere of calm and credibility. Few internal changes were planned as everyone wanted a return to normalcy. Over time, Jameson established his legitimacy, gathered resources, and ultimately defeated a coalition of board members. He became increasingly controlling and clearly dominated board meetings. He did not delegate responsibility to his assistants and would frequently walk into their offices when they were meeting with others to find out what was happening. He chaired and ran all principals' meetings. He answered questions addressed to others at all kinds of gatherings. He was extremely effective at impression management and cooling out potential opposition. He was the central figure in the district and believed and acted as if his words were final.

This contrasted markedly with Rob Simpson, who became superintendent less than a year before our observation, in Meadmont. He came from another community and thus was a newcomer to Meadmont. Simpson's predecessor ruled for over two decades with an iron hand. He intimidated his assistants, "his" boards, and the staff. His own approach to people created problems and some problems in the district were glossed over by him. When Simpson was being recruited, he was told by the board that "communication" was the major priority, that they wanted a more open

responsive administration. Simpson accepted that and publicly made it his primary goal. He appeared to all others to be a good, sympathetic, and receptive listener so some did, in fact, begin communicating concerns and problems. In addition, he also inherited a number of suppressed and avoided issues which generated negotiations.

Simpson's style of administration was quite different from his predecessor and also from his counterpart in Cooley Corners. He delegated far more responsibility to others and assumed that they would or could work things out without his involvement. If issues came to his attention, he would likely tell participants to reach an agreement or he would have to impose one. He was generally a cautious, conservative person who avoided confrontation and sought compromise. Sometimes his cautious compromising made him appear more responsive and weaker than he actually was. The delegation of authority, the cautious approach, the willingness to talk and compromise all facilitated and encouraged negotiation. Simpson, in addition, had a change agenda of his own which he slowly revealed to his associates. He left it to them to plan and implement which also led to negotiations.

There were some significant differences between the boards of education which affected negotiations. Members of the Meadmont board, in general, took a more active interest in the school system. They were better informed about education in general as well as about local school district affairs. They went much more frequently to regional, state, and national meetings. They believed they were more in control in Meadmont than did those in Cooley Corners. And if they felt they were losing control, then they were more willing to push the issue than their Cooley Corners counterparts. They were more willing to search out issues, respond to community concerns, and to act independently of the administration. A crucial

difference was that the board in Cooley Corners met only once a month while in Meadmont they met at least twice so they had more time to discuss and negotiate. Some Meadmont board members spent a good deal of time talking outside the meetings. They were willing to do the political work necessary to create a coalition. They were less likely to call the administration and get a problem resolved on the phone. Cooley Corners board members were much more likely to be dealt with by the administration on an individual basis.

The differences between the coalitions on the boards were interesting. In Cooley Corners, it consisted of one man and two women. In Meadmont it was three men. The men have been harder to dissuade so the administration has had to compromise or comply. In Cooley Corners, Jameson knew the women would not follow through and would not become assertive in their opposition, so he refused to bend and simply argued back or deflected the issue--and won.

The assistant superintendents, two in each district, tended to dampen negotiation. The two in Meadmont, Bernard Johnston and Cyril Overton, were long-time incumbents of their positions and proteges of the previous superintendent. While they now had greater authority and responsibility under Simpson than his predecessor, they defined their position as complying with his directives and keeping his life as uncomplicated as possible. They tended to be extremely bureaucratic, orderly, and conservative. Cyril Overton, who handled finance and administration, was regarded as somewhat more approachable and more of a "good old boy." Johnston, who handled personnel and curriculum, was avoided whenever possible by subordinates throughout the system. His attachment to tradition was so strong that the arduous process of trying to move him from his bureaucratic position was not often undertaken.

In Cooley Corners, Tommy Wilson had accumulated over twenty years in the district. He was narrow and conservative in his approach to education. His responsibilities, during our study, were reduced to buildings and grounds. He was perceived as incompetent by half the board, his assistant superintendent colleague, and many on the staff. Most people avoided him because he would not affect their area or they knew he was powerless or unsympathetic. His own inadequacy was the source of a major negotiation involving the school board itself and between the board and the superintendent (Hall and Spencer-Hall, 1979). It was on this issue that Jameson, in supporting Wilson, achieved dominance over the board when a prospective fourth member of the coalition defected and the women board members refused to defend their position in opposition to Wilson.

Russell Shaw, on the other hand, was a young, close, lifetime friend of Jameson's. He appeared to be open and receptive to people in his area of curriculum and personnel. He also had ideas and changes that he wanted to implement. He was unable to do so because Jameson kept him overshadowed and controlled. Shaw's own organizational approach was more power-dominated than it appeared. He liked to structure situations that appeared democratic, but he effectively controlled them as he did in the development of a gifted program and the selection of textbooks (Hall and Spencer-Hall, 1979).

Meadmont had directors of health services, elementary education, transportation, community relations, and buildings and grounds as well as a number of coordinators, e.g., library, art, and speech therapy. All had some degree of autonomy and the complexity of their relationships, particularly with building principals and staff, led to a number of negotiations. Frequent negotiation occurred between the elementary education

and special education directors and a building principal about additional space, personnel, materials, funds or parents' complaints.

Transportation in Meadmont was a larger and more complex situation than in Cooley Corners. The director in Meadmont had to deal with a much larger area, more children, parents, buildings, drivers, principals, etc. The director was perceived by most principals and some board members to be inadequate for the position. One consequence of this was that he frequently found himself involved in negotiations which he could not control or in which he was not successful.

The director of health services was a nurse who was responsible for several buildings as well. In general, health services were understaffed so that negotiations went on within the system in terms of the distribution of those resources. The director also took an active interest in students and staff beyond the minimal physical health concerns. As a result, she was more involved in working out problems with principals and teachers than would be normal for someone in her position. She was also attempting to get the district to expand her area in terms of health education and personnel so that she attempted negotiations directly with the superintendent. A major conflict between her and a building principal, who claimed his building was not getting its share of her time, led to her resignation. The superintendent instructed the building principal and the health services director to work it out or he would. They negotiated an agreement. She returned to work but permanently resigned after we left the district.

Community relations had been the source of some negotiations primarily because board members, and eventually the superintendent, believed that the director did not have the skills necessary for election campaigns or a public relations program. The superintendent had been reluctant to

remove such a veteran and had personal difficulty firing him. So he eventually negotiated, through discussions with the board and one of the secondary buildings, the return of that person to an administrative position.

The reader may note that no mention has been made of a director of secondary education. There was one but he was also principal of the high school. This dual role resulted in a structural conflict which pitted one of the junior high principals against the senior high principal-director because of perceived restrictions upon the former's autonomy. Members of his staff were required to get high school department head authorization when they spent funds, took trips, etc. The building principal argued against that and said his staff supported him. The evidence was ambiguous because some of his staff wanted some freedom from him and this system provided it. The junior high principal had on numerous occasions drawn the assistant superintendents into the situation to achieve limited change. His attempt to get the superintendent to resolve the contradiction failed. The superintendent tried to get the high school principal to give up that position and become a full-time director of secondary education. He refused the "promotion." The situation consequently promoted a number of negotiations.

Cooley Corners had only two separate directors--Title I and special education--and several coordinators--reading and special education. The roles of the Title I director and reading coordinator were quite limited. The area of special education provided for frequent negotiations; but because Cooley Corners had resisted mainstreaming, the frequency and consequences were less than in Meadmont.

A comparison of the principals in the two districts shows sharp, significant differences. At the elementary level, Meadmont had recently

hired five new, young principals. Most were pursuing doctorates in education and had designs for career mobility. Collectively, they had been pushing for greater building autonomy rather than the central office control of Simpson's predecessor. The elementary principals had an organization which met without other administrators present and relayed formal requests for salary and working conditions to the administration. They also met once a month with the director of elementary education in a formal session. After that meeting they convened in the parking lot for an informal session. One principal told Peter Hall that this was where all the important decisions were made. Most of the newer principals and their wives were part of a social network that included the director of elementary education and his wife. They viewed him as a friend, as approachable, and a defender of their interests. He was quite supportive of them as well. Their push for autonomy, their organization, the orientation to instructional change, and the good relations with the director led to numerous contacts and arrangements.

The elementary principals in Cooley Corners were older, less educated, less assertive, and unorganized as a collectivity. They never met as a group without the superintendent. They never made collective requests. The board and the administration believed most of them to be, at best, adequate. They were not seen to be providing educational leadership in their buildings. Because of the way they defined their roles and because of declining enrollments, they were less likely to make requests to the central administration. They stifled the potential initiative of their teachers by telling them the central administration would say "no." The result was low frequency of negotiation.

The high school principals also demonstrated some important differences. Al Lindsay at Cooley Corners took pride in "running a tight ship."

He was conservative and traditional about education, a strict disciplinarian, and very bureaucratic in his administrative style. He was perceived by his teachers and school board members as unapproachable and inflexible. At the same time, he busied himself in ways that kept him uninformed about what was happening in the school or in the classroom. Ernest Palmer, on the other hand, in Meadmont, viewed one of his primary roles as a mediator and negotiator (the central administration also saw him this way). He prided himself as a developer of extra-curricular activities. He left routine and curriculum to one of his assistants. Whether by choice or by imposition from above in the past, he had allowed a number of faculty to become "prima donnas" in extra-curricular areas. He recognized the tensions this caused but regarded that as a necessary consequence of an excellent high school. While other teachers noted that Palmer was the power in the school and were resentful of the extra-curricular emphasis, they were aware that Palmer was "flexible" and agreements could be individually negotiated at times if necessary. Lindsay had no tolerance for prima donnas and did not encourage those who had such designs or teachers, in general, who wanted to make arrangements.

The intermediate level was more complicated. One junior high principal in Meadmont was viewed by his staff to be ineffective. The administration and the board concurred in this judgment. They were hoping for a bond issue to solve the problem by providing a big new junior high building with a new principal. As long as he was the principal, his staff decided to use one of two tacks. Generally they worked out numerous arrangements among themselves which precluded the necessity of consulting him. The other was to choose a teacher whom he was known to respect and to have that person negotiate with him. We mentioned the

other junior high principal in terms of the conflict with the high school principal. He was supportive of his staff and his building and dominated it. He did not hesitate to make requests or demands. The result of his lobbying was that his building had greater resources than the other junior high but there was less internal negotiation.

The middle school principal in Cooley Corners was known for his rigid adherence to rules and procedures by administrators, board members and teachers. His staff perceived him to be cold and uninterested in classroom problems. He therefore discouraged negotiations within the school and if problems occurred, he would issue an edict. He did not make requests or demands upon the administration. He regarded himself as an administration man and his job was to keep the school running smoothly. The net effect was that, for varying reasons, Meadmont's intermediate schools were the context for more negotiations.

A comparison of teachers in the two districts also results in greater negotiations in Meadmont. One obvious difference was in the level of teacher militancy. A very active vocal nucleus of teachers, primarily at the high school, had tripled its membership in a rival teachers' group in a year and was viewed as a serious threat by the recognized organization, the central administration, and most of the board. Members of that group were interested in matters other than salary as well and had begun attempts to resolve old problems, institute new changes, and recruit new members on the basis of handling their specific problems or general concerns. Their recent successes, claimed or not, heightened their sense of efficacy and the likelihood of more negotiating activity. Teachers in Cooley Corners have basically adapted to the system. Most ignore their own organization. Most have a generally negative attitude about desiring or implementing change or becoming more assertive with any level of

administration. Many of them expect failure in the classroom, in the system, and in the community. For many teachers in Cooley Corners, given their perceptions of their students and the structure of the district, there was simply a desire to get through the day, the week, and the year. While clearly a good deal of that existed in Meadmont, there was more of a sense of pride in the district, confidence in their own abilities, and a collective and individual assertiveness.

Community context also provides differences in negotiation activity. Meadmont had a large parochial school system supported by an active, vocal, religious community. There was a long history of opposition from this group to the public schools. Negotiations have occurred in the past and during the course of our study around bond issues, public debates, and busing. While Cooley Corners had parochial schools, at no time were they the subject of concern to the public school system.

In addition, Meadmont's larger professional, business, and white-collar community had generated more individuals proportionately involved with the public schools, larger and more active extra-curricular support groups who lobbied with the board and administration, and generally more voluntary associations who made requests of the school district for attention to special groups, help with their activities, or changes in the school program.

While this section has focused upon individuals and their styles, perceptions, and other subjective phenomena, we do not discount structural forms over a long period of time. They do help provide a dynamic in the organizational life. According to what we have been told in comparison with the previous time period in Meadmont, there are people at all levels of the district who view negotiation as a possible or reasonable approach to solving problems and handling issues. There are, in addition, people

at all levels who view changes as being necessary including giving autonomy to more participants. The fact that some of those at higher levels are less willing than in the past to impose rulings parallels the growing sense of militancy among the teachers and control among the principals.

In Cooley Corners, the participants at all levels tend not to be efficacious about negotiations nor believe them a possible or reasonable approach. The board does not believe it can control the administration. The teachers do not believe they can effectively negotiate with principals or the administration. Principals and other administrators feel constrained by the superintendent. We are not suggesting that in fact the system runs smoothly or is coordinated, but simply that negotiations are less frequent. There is in Cooley Corners a great deal of loose coupling, avoidance, and overlooking. There is a lot of ritualistic rhetoric with little follow-up.

Limits on Schools as Negotiated Orders

Far less negotiation was observed in the two districts than we had anticipated. There was more often a loose coupling of intention and action, an inhaling of frustration and an exhaling of "making do," a bureaucratic ruling, the threat of sanctions, an overlooking, ignoring or covering over. Strauss (1978) pointed out that there are a number of alternatives to negotiation--coercion, manipulation, appeals to rules, appeals to authority, education, and persuasion. Coercion, however, was not a prominent feature of either system. Rather compliant behavior, a resigned acceptance of the status quo, or the other alternatives were much more common. Attempting to account for this situation leads in a number of directions including discussing the daily life of schooling, its unit of focus, the structure of the organization, the distribution of power, the

gender composition of the system, the effect of the past, the direction of organizational attention and commitments, and the structural context surrounding education.

The daily life of the school building is characterized by ritual, practicality, segmentation, and superficial intermittent interaction. The day is divided into periods with teachers and students routinely moving through them without difficulty although frequently with fatigue or boredom. Most teachers do not see many of their colleagues or their superiors other than in a passing through or passing by fashion. Administrators tend to be in their offices or out of the building so they see only a few children, teachers, or parents during a day. Off periods and lunch times tend to be short, hectic, or with chores to do. At the end of the day, most teachers and some building administrators want to go home to escape, relax, fix meals, attend to kids. They are never enthralled about after-school meetings or conferences. Throughout the day, their concern has been to make it through the day--a very practical orientation. Doing that is done most often in isolation from others. What contact there is with other adults is limited in time and in content. These are not the conditions of negotiation. Structurally, there are limited opportunities for negotiation.

The unit of operational focus of the school is the classroom in comparison with the case in the hospital. A focus on the case involving a number of staff simultaneously or by coordination allows for interpretations, differences, and negotiation. Despite the rhetoric of individualization in the schools, collectivization of "treatment" via the classroom leads to suppressing differences, standardizing and routinizing the interaction. These patterns do not lend themselves to negotiation. In general, what exists is the almost total responsibility for the individual by one staff

member all day or the sequencing of responsibility with minimal coordination or concern. A major concern, however, inside and outside the classroom is with management. There the focus may be on troublesome individuals. The fact, however, that these are children limits their ability to negotiate. Administrators, if involved in discipline, almost always assume that the teacher was correct. Institutions populated by adults should generate more negotiation than those with children. The fact that the children's parents must rely on reports rather than observation lessens their ability to negotiate in behalf of their offspring.

That separation and the fragmentation of the school system into a number of school buildings and different offices for the administration insulates them from negotiation. The higher an administrator was in the hierarchy, the less the time that was spent in school buildings. Even the directors of various areas spent most of their time in the central office rather than touring the buildings or observing in classrooms. Awareness of what occurred at the building level was dependent upon verbal accounts or written memos. The assumption was nothing untoward was happening, and education was occurring unless they heard something. The lack of active coordination, monitoring, or providing opportunities for access structurally discouraged negotiation. In addition, those at the apex of each level strove to create the impression of control and competency by limiting the frequency of interlevel contacts with problems and requests. Difficulties would be created if awareness of a problem became public or was discovered by a superior before being handled or reported by the appropriate administrator. In addition, both districts' administrators became livid if anyone violated the chain of command, e.g., a teacher calling a board member to complain or inform. This discouraged the emergence of a number of problems and consequent negotiations.

The formal and perceived distribution of power in the systems inversely affected the extent of negotiations. Those without resources or who perceived they were powerless clearly restrained themselves. Teachers, in general, could not even conceive collectively that they could alter circumstances. Most felt the board, the superintendent, and the central administration were a distant all-seeing, all-knowing, omnipotent THEY. Some teachers individually felt sufficiently strong, often because of outside support or because they were defined as superior teachers, to negotiate with principals, particularly if the principal was seen as responsive. Ineffectiveness, ignorance or weakness on the part of the principal often led to teachers negotiating among themselves. Most, however, were passive with their principal. Often this was because they recognized the principal was structurally limited. While principals had more resources, influence, and authority, they often complained about an unresponsive superior, the lack of congruence between their agenda and the superintendent's, budget restrictions, and broader political realities. To the extent that negotiations crossed levels, they were most likely to be with immediate superiors. The fact that that might be unrewarding or that the solution really lay elsewhere constrained negotiation. One would have to convince one's superior that it was worth his going to a higher level and putting himself on the line.

Negotiations were more frequent at the higher levels of the system, because participants had more knowledge, resources, responsibility, and authority. On the other hand, we clearly observed what has been established numerous times, namely that the superintendent and the central administration have more operational power than the board of education (Zeigler and Jennings, 1974; Tucker and Zeigler, 1980; Spencer-Hall and Hall, 1979). The boards became dependent upon the administration for

information and guidance. Structurally, they are induced to trust the administration because of limited time and because it reflects upon the board's own ability to choose administrators. The administration utilizes a combination of ideological professionalism and educational expertise to define issues as technical and non-negotiable. The board has the tendency to defer to the superintendent and accepts, literally and figuratively, the agenda constructed by the superintendent.

Perhaps more than ideology or expertise, the problem of formal power is due to the avocational part-time involvement by board members versus the vocational full-time commitment of the administrator. To be an effective board member requires a great deal of time and effort to pursue concerns or ferret out problems. Those board members who try to be concerned policy-makers discover that their other role obligations assert their prior claims and restrict school involvement. In addition, most board members lack the free time, the interest, or the skills to do the political work necessary to create majority coalitions to counter their peers or the administration. Most board members go from meeting to meeting and limit the challenges to the administration. The net effect was a large gap between intentions and actions, between decision and implementation. New board members tend to be the "trouble-makers" but one administrator remarked that it takes about a year to train a new board member to be a team member. Under normal conditions, administration-board interaction is characterized by the latter following and accommodating to the former.

Another limitation on the frequency of negotiation is that the distribution of sexes parallels and overlaps the authority hierarchy. Men are in larger numbers in all levels except for classroom teachers where about two-thirds are women. Men are most predominant at the

central administration and principal levels. Over 90% of administrators and principals in both districts were men. Two-thirds of the board members were male. Both men and women on the boards accepted this quota or believed the communities would never elect more. In general, few women teachers in these districts aspired to administrative positions. Women administrators in those districts had image problems for being pushy, brassy, or cold. Most women teachers, particularly the older ones, were passive, deferential, and compliant. Simpson and Simpson (1969) have perceptively analyzed in depth the consequences of socialization, sex roles, family organization, and cultural values on the behavior of semi-professional women in organizations run by men. (We should note that we agree that teachers are not professionals but are better characterized as semi-professionals.) Among the teachers, more militancy was seen among the men and the younger, better-educated women teachers. While they took organizational leadership where possible, their strength was limited by their numbers and other factors--turnover, cooptation. The overall impact meant less resistance and assertion and therefore less negotiation.

The weight of history and tradition together with perceptions of the community and resource availability have limited negotiations. People in the community and in the schools have developed patterns and views that condition them not to question or offer alternatives. "You can't teach evolution or have sex education in this town;" "They won't be professionally committed to in-service;" "They have never known what it is to try and win and then win--so they don't try." Both communities and districts can be characterized as conservative in orientation. Limited changes in the '70's toward reforms, openness, and departmentalization at the elementary level are being eased back into traditional patterns. In addition,

the past commitment of resources or the failure to obtain more at an earlier time constrain the systems. Old buildings, weak administrators, a junior high instead of a high school, a poor salary schedule contribute to a sense of obstacles that cannot be overcome.

This situation is reinforced by the external situation. On the one hand, fewer proportions of people in the community have children in the public schools. This leads to fewer people having a vested interest in the schools, and fewer making demands or requests. In addition, it leads to declining support and exacerbates problems of sufficient resources, credibility, legitimacy, and support. On the other hand, school board members, administrators, and teachers increasingly complain about federal and state mandates, laws, and funding which restrict their flexibility. All in all, it is a period of curtailment, decline, cutback or, at best, standing still. Rather than expansion and reform, it is a period of "back to basics" and school closings. The net effect is often one of internal resignation or acquiescence rather than suggesting new alternatives. While constraint may engender negotiation, it will do so across the boundaries of the district rather than within. It has also led to increasing attention to public relations and positive image which constrain internal negotiations, possible conflicts, and "bad news."

The final factor which limited negotiations in the two districts was the focus of organizational attention and the consequent commitment of resources. Both districts were involved continuously and heavily on building programs and election campaigns to pass bond issues (Hall, 1981). Most board and administration time was devoted to the bond campaigns. While that led to negotiations among them, they required 100% internal collective effort and abided no opposition. It meant that they had less time to consider other issues so those were given short attention,

stop-gap solutions, ignored or tabled. Also, the bond issues were to be the solutions to multiple problems so participants withheld their ideas, plans, or problems. Others kept problems to themselves because they knew of the preoccupation of key decision-makers and did not want to be the cause of deflecting attention, bringing more bad news, or not being a good team player. The time, efforts, and importance of this one issue restricted negotiation because it precluded the emergence of other problems.

Conclusion

The ultimate purpose for writing this paper is to develop an under standing of the relationship of social conditions to the negotiated order. A review of Strauss' (1978:107-122) summary of the research allows us to present the context in which he and his colleagues were able to perceive and conceive the model. In addition, a brief analysis of special education in the districts we observed helps reinforce an awareness of the circumstances that contribute to negotiation.

In the late 1950's there were many changes taking place in society, in the helping professions, and in psychiatry about the treatment of psychiatric patients and the organization of therapy in public institutions. Within this situation of ideological diversity and organizational change, the hospital studied by Strauss and colleagues had a new superintendent who desired to innovate change on the wards. He recruited young psychiatrists who were inexperienced with state hospitals. He offered them a team of professionals and a great deal of autonomy on their wards. What they had to do was both implement their ideas about therapy into practice and simultaneously organize a team who were thrown together for the first time. All of them confronted novelty much of the time. Change,

experimentation, inexperience, ideological differences, ambiguity, and coordination all are conducive to negotiation. For that setting the term negotiated order seems an apt analytic description.

We did observe one area of public schooling where negotiation was prominent, i.e., special education. Many of its characteristics and operations are quite similar to Strauss' depiction of the psychiatric wards. It remains a relatively new domain within education in terms of theory, practice, and organization and therefore represents novelty. Special education involves a number of staff with different specialties, knowledge, and approaches. They are also, because of their longer, specialized training and advanced degrees, more likely to believe they are and act like professionals than the typical teacher. In addition, their students are dealt with as individual cases. The referral process and its consequences are more likely to involve parents in deciding what happens to the child than in the traditional setting. The decision about placement and the creation of the Individual Educational Program (IEP) are the result of a committee decision where the various specialized persons offer information and discuss alternative diagnoses, placements, and programs. Given federal and state mandates, districts theoretically must serve all individuals who qualify. Classroom teachers often seek to remove troublesome students by having them labelled for special education. Commonly, then, there are problems about adequate and increased space and staff for these programs which require negotiations with special education teachers, principals, directors, and assistant superintendents. The mainstreaming requirement has put an extra burden on a number of classroom teachers, particularly in specialized subjects--art, music, physical education, science, social studies. They frequently find these children difficult to deal with and thus consult or confront the special education teacher or the principal

about what to do. Special education classes are smaller and more likely to have aides and assistance than the regular classroom. The regular classroom teachers are often upset by this. The result is that they begin to make requests to administrators for more assistance. Finally, there is the situation where special education teachers have the principal as their immediate superior, but also are responsible to the director of special education, creating ambiguities and conflicts. All of the above are conducive to negotiation and represent dramatic differences with the typical school and classroom situation.

By utilizing the conditions from Strauss, our observations of special education, the differences between the two districts, and the limits on negotiation we are now in a position to list and briefly analyze factors which influence the occurrences of negotiation.

1) An organization that is growing and expanding will show more negotiation than one that is declining, and a declining one will have more negotiation than one that is stable. Growth and expansion signify surplus resources, new programs or units, increased size or complexity, more attention to coordination and monitoring, and an optimistic view of the world. All of these should stimulate negotiation. The stable organization presumably has worked out patterns that are satisfactory, routine, known, and accepted by participants. The declining organization will probably differentially handle the curtailment. Vested interests and affected groups will lobby for their concerns. Because an entity's survival or a person's job may be at stake, they will be motivated to mobilize actions and try among other things, negotiation.

2) A successful organization will show more negotiation than a failing one. A successful organization will have more resources than a failing one. While they could be the same size and receive the same amount

of funds, the former will have still more resources in the form of external support and credibility and internal motivation, cohesion, and concern. Much of this translates into a sense that one is doing something important and that one's self is tied up with the organizational accomplishment. Greater concern about what is happening leads a person into taking a more active role in how the organization is run. If success begets negotiation, failure begets retreat and accommodation. With a failing organization, participants view changing, trying, and organizing as fantasy and useless. The negative collective image creates low morale, minimal motivation, and either withdrawal or passivity. They are not likely to make suggestions, organize collectively, or assert differences. Participants will reject responsibility and identification. "It is someone else's fault. It is not my organization and it is not 'me' on the line," they will say. That is not conducive to negotiation.

3) Activities that are routinized, standardized, and performed individually and in isolation will show less negotiation than activities that are variable, individualized, publicly performed and involve teamwork. Much of the daily activity of classroom teachers negates negotiation as the above conditions and earlier discussion indicated. On the other hand, the "case" nature, novel circumstances, coordination of multiple persons with information shared by all led to negotiation in the hospital. We would suppose that those public school situations characterized as open classrooms and open schools, team teaching, individualized instruction, and coordinated departmentalization would be more characteristic of negotiation than the generally traditional situations we observed. Obviously in the former situations there are more factors that are unknown or are allowed to vary while more effort is required from more people conjointly to be successful. If people are publicly accountable and need to interact

to get a job done under unclear conditions, it seems logical they will negotiate. On the other hand, if others are only minimally necessary and the activity is clear, known and simple, little negotiation should occur.

4) The greater the size and complexity of the organization, the greater the degree of negotiation. The larger the organization the more likely is it that critical masses of individuals will be created who can effectively interact as units. The greater the complexity the more likely that subinterests will be created that differ with those interests at the top. Greater size and complexity theoretically should create greater attention to coordination. On the other hand, greater size and complexity may mean people feel freer to act on their own and in their own or subgroup interests because they are not monitored as easily. If greater complexity entails more ancillary services and staff units (vs. line), then theory orientation should engender negotiation. Smaller organizations should be compact, simplified, and easily monitored. They should not generate as many separate interests nor allow as much autonomy.

5) Equality and wide dispersions of power are conducive to negotiation while strong degrees of asymmetry and concentrations of power are not. Power constrains not only the results of negotiation but its occurrence as well. The enforcement of the chain of command discourages people from going past superiors. The professionals in the mental hospital felt in varying ways more equal to each other than teachers vs. principals or superintendents. Teachers are more likely to negotiate with each other than they are with those above them. But in systems where power is more widely dispersed all participants are more likely to engage in negotiations than those in which it is concentrated. In Cooley Corners, Jameson dominated the system and centralized power while Simpson dispersed it.

Observations by one of the authors of small rural districts where superintendents oversee K-12 in one building with unlimited authority show few examples of negotiation. They are characterized by alienation, fear, withdrawal, and rapid turnover.

It is worthwhile commenting here upon teachers who were willing to assert themselves and negotiate with their superiors. In each case, they had outside resources or alternatives that increased their influence. Some used their community and family status, which was as high or higher than that of their colleagues or some superiors, as a bargaining counter. Others used community groups of high status persons who would lobby or pressure the administration or the board. Others with scarce skills could threaten to leave. Others used collective groups, lawyers, or the courts.

An obvious corollary of this discussion is that ineffective use of power by a superior is conducive to negotiation. Weakness, inadequacy, inattention, indecisiveness, and disorder provoke assertiveness on the part of subordinates. In a number of schools with weak principals or principals who were permissive or not evident in the school or the classroom, teachers ran the school, made arrangements, and handled problems. In some instances, they did this with the knowledge of higher ups who did not replace the ineffective administrators.

6) Administrative succession, particularly by an outsider following authoritarian rule and suppression of dissent and problems, will be conducive to more negotiation; while no change, or promoting an experienced insider, in a system that tolerated negotiation will show less. There are a number of important aspects to this statement. Succession marks an interruption and an ambiguity in leadership, policy-making, implementation, and coordination. It allows interested groups and individuals to

specify and move on their concerns. Boards tend to be more forceful with new superintendents, for example. Bringing an outsider to an organization forces him or her to defer in terms of knowledge and resources until s/he can build up a stockpile and establish legitimacy and control. Authoritarian domination will have meant that, following the idea of negotiative constraint with extreme asymmetry, people have withheld problems, issues, suggestions and concerns for fear of being punished or humiliated. Many of these may have begun to emerge when the old leader's retirement is certain and before the new one takes over.

Within the typical order of the school system with a continuing superintendent, negotiation is not the common feature of decision-making, problem-solving or administrative action. Promoting an insider tends to mean someone who is committed to the old ways, particularly if it is a former assistant superintendent, and who already has the knowledge base. That would mean less of a vacuum or of ambiguity. Finally, a system which has tended to deal with problems and to do some of that by negotiation will have fewer unresolved issues while undergoing executive change.

7) A system undergoing proposed or planned change will show more negotiation than one tending toward tradition. Not only does proposing change or implementing change create new situations, problematic coordination, and the inevitable gap between theory and practice, it also creates a condition where others foresee the possibilities of proposing other kinds of change. Externally mandated change will often bring out resistance and attempts to bargain and minimize the effect. A typical strategy of planned change is to involve participants in the change process. That will require a great deal of effort in order to control it, but it should also show evidence of apparent give-and-take. In addition, new programs

never work the way they were intended because contingencies emerge which were not anticipated and things that were supposed to be self-evident are not. Changes may also bring new responsibilities or decreased power to some who will act to clarify, balance, and defend their positions. A system operating traditionally will have presumably worked through most of these issues.

8) An organization whose leadership delegates authority, tolerates individuality and development of semi-autonomous programs, favors compromise over confrontation, and defines itself as a mediator will show more negotiation than one which centralizes authority, stifles creativity and development, prefers domination or conflict, and has a self-conception of the decision-maker. The former approach not only allows the creation of subgroup interests which create a basis for consciousness and problems of coordination and control, but the appearance to others that such ideas are acceptable. In addition, this approach, which has some appearance of being democratic, encourages give and take, wider involvement, and decision-making at lower levels and among equals. Bureaucratic rigidity and authoritarian dominance suppress involvement. Being willing to talk and listen and to be a mediator legitimates the expression of differences. Administrators who resist making decisions and encouraging others to work it out stimulate negotiation. The more opportunities for decision-making or problem-handling and the wider the participant involvement, the more likely negotiation will take place. Limiting the opportunities either by holding few meetings, dominating the agenda and the discussion, discouraging autonomy, and presenting oneself as the controller prevent situations from emerging where negotiation can take place.

Strauss' addition of actors' theories of negotiation is crucial to understanding organizational processes. Participants, particularly those

in key positions who see compromise and mediation as typical or desired, support and catalyze its occurrence. At the same time, they must effectively use resources and strategies to maintain control or else they appear weak and indecisive, which can be their undoing.

9) Professionals in organizations are more likely to engage in negotiations than semi-professionals. The combination of ideology, status, expertise, power, sex, and self-conception will make professionals more autonomous and with a felt sense of being in control. That will lead them to create situations, make suggestions, strive for dominance, etc. This has a greater likelihood of leading to negotiation. Semi-professionals, because of the contradictions in their position, will tend to defer. Much of the conditions of professionalism are absent in the working conditions of teachers and they know that. They recognize the bureaucratic structure limits their autonomy, yet their rhetoric of professionalism interestingly often prevents them from asserting themselves. The consequence of this is that organizations with large numbers of semi-professionals controlled by bureaucrats or professionals will be characterized by less negotiation than those with larger proportions of professionals, e.g., schools vs. hospitals.

10) Organizations confronted with an aroused environment will show more negotiation than one in the midst of a passive context. The more people in the community are interested in and mobilized about the schools, the more issues they will bring to the different levels. Thus negotiations can take place across the organizational boundaries at the board, administration, or building level. This, in addition, should engender negotiation within and across levels within the organization. The quiet community places little pressure upon the system.

11) The greater the focus of attention and commitment of resources by an organization, the less the degree of negotiation, particularly if the case involves the external environment. The presence of a moderate number of issues with moderate intensity is likely to generate the greatest degree of negotiation. Concern with unity in the face of external conflict or with a single dominant issue prevents the emergence of internal differences and the attendant negotiation. People have neither the time nor the inclination to press ahead. On the other hand, issues of moderate intensity are important enough to be pushed and yet do not require a simple single imposed solution. The life of the organization is not threatened so alternatives could be tolerated.

12) Finally, the greater the structural contradictions in an organization, the greater the negotiation. The more areas of responsibility are divided or the more employees have two or or more superiors, the more ambiguities and conflicts will occur which will suggest negotiation. The division of responsibility between the assistant superintendents in Meadmont means the director of elementary education and his principals have to deal with both in hiring more staff or starting a program that requires more funds. Also in Meadmont, special education teachers are responsible to their principals and to the director of special education which often creates problems and negotiations. The strict line hierarchy avoids those kinds of problems.

While we have just begun to sketch out some generalizations about conditions which facilitate or discourage negotiations, we do believe that this constitutes an advance over previous work. Strauss (1978) has added arguments, elements, and some conceptualization to the original formulations of the negotiated order. He has, in addition, pointed out some implications and future research to be done. The Days (1977) and Benson

(1977) have stressed some significant limitations of the model. Maines (1977) and Charlton and Maines (1980) have summarized the argument, linked the negotiated order to larger social entities, and asserted its strengths. What we need now is the increase of empirical studies of different kinds of organizations under different kinds of conditions to determine where the metaphor is most applicable and then to develop grounded theories about its operations.

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Table 1--Number of public school systems and number of pupils enrolled, by size of system: United States, fall 1978

Enrollment size	School systems		Pupils enrolled	
	Number	Percent	Number (in thousands)[1]	Percent
1	2	3	4	5
Total	15,994	100.0	42,944	100.0
25,000 or more	184	1.2	11,984	27.9
10,000 to 24,999	511	3.2	7,435	17.3
5,000 to 9,999	1,105	6.9	7,698	17.9
2,500 to 4,999	2,068	12.9	7,194	16.8
1,000 to 2,499	3,460	21.6	5,670	13.2
600 to 999	1,831	11.4	1,442	3.4
300 to 599	2,314	14.5	1,014	2.4
1 to 299	4,234	26.5	508	1.2
None[2]	287	1.8	0	.0

[1] Enrollment data are not strictly comparable from State to State.
[2] Systems not operating schools.

NOTE.--The above data on school systems and enrollment differ slightly from those published in Statistics of Public Elementary and Secondary Day Schools, Fall 1978. Because of rounding, details in columns 4 and 5 do not add to totals.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, Education Directory, Public School Systems, 1979-80.